President Trump has imposed steep tariffs on Chinese imports with the dual goal of reducing China’s export volume and encouraging investment and manufacturing in the United States. The basic idea is straightforward: if imported goods from China become too expensive due to tariffs, manufacturers will be incentivized to relocate production to the U.S., and new domestic companies will emerge to offer similar products at competitive prices—cheaper than the cost of Chinese goods plus the added tariff.
At the same time, President Trump acknowledges that these tariffs will generate substantial revenue for the U.S. government. Despite this, Democrats and mainstream media critics have attacked the policy, claiming “it won’t work.”
Yet many of those same critics also argue that tariffs make products more expensive—essentially admitting that the policy works. And if imported goods are still being purchased, it logically follows that the government is earning tariff revenue.
Under President Trump’s new tariff regime, the U.S. government could earn an estimated $30–50 billion annually from tariffs targeting Chinese imports. These tariffs span high-tech sectors, green energy, and critical manufacturing inputs. While generating revenue, they also serve a broader strategic goal: reducing dependency on China and re-shoring American industry. These numbers can be verified by checking U.S. Customs and Border Protection data, Congressional Budget Office projections, and historical tariff revenue reports from the U.S. Treasury.
The left is sending mixed messages. On one hand, they claim that tariffs make everything more expensive and will cause working families to starve. On the other hand, they argue that tariffs only increase prices by a few dollars—just enough to supposedly ruin lives, but somehow not enough to generate meaningful government revenue or incentivize domestic manufacturing. Obviously, both of these claims cannot be true—and in reality, neither is.
To support their argument, a popular post circulating on LinkedIn claims that U.S. tariffs on China have little impact on American consumers. The example used is Lululemon, which reportedly pays just $6 to a Chinese supplier for pants that retail for $150. The post argues that even with tariffs, the price increase would be negligible—perhaps just $2 per pair—and that any larger hike would simply be corporate greed.
But this argument relies on a flawed understanding of how tariffs work. The U.S. government doesn’t assess tariffs based on what Lululemon pays its factory in China. Tariffs are based on the FOB (Free on Board) value declared at the U.S. port of entry—that is, the full import value of the product when it arrives, not the production cost in China.
For apparel and similar consumer goods, the FOB value often includes wholesaler markups, agent fees, and other embedded costs, making it far higher than the factory price. A reasonable estimate is that the FOB value is about 50% of the final retail price. So for a $150 pair of pants, the declared import value might be closer to $75—not $6. A 25% tariff on $75 would add $18.75 to the cost—not $2. That’s a significant increase, especially across large volumes.
Critics—many of whom lean socialist—insist that companies should simply absorb the cost. However, most apparel retailers operate on slim profit margins, typically around 5–10%. Absorbing an $18 cost increase on a $150 product would erase much of that margin—or push it negative. Companies can’t just “eat the cost” if it means operating at a 12.5% loss.
In short, this example actually proves that tariffs significantly raise the price of Chinese goods. If people continue buying these products, the government collects substantial revenue. And it also demonstrates a major opportunity for both U.S. and foreign companies to manufacture domestically and offer comparable products at a lower price than the tariffed imports.
Another argument claims that exporters can simply lie about the value of goods to avoid paying tariffs. However, this overlooks how international trade actually works. Goods shipped across oceans are almost always part of complex credit arrangements. Importers rarely pay cash upfront—instead, these purchases are typically financed through bank loans or lines of credit. Because of this, the goods must be insured during transit, and both the lender and insurer require accurate documentation.
That means the declared value of the shipment must match the amount financed and insured. If a lower value were declared at customs to dodge tariffs, it would either violate the terms of the loan, void the insurance coverage, or both. Banks and insurers won’t accept fake numbers, because they’re financially exposed. In short, the financial system that underpins global trade enforces accurate valuation—not customs officers with clipboards. So, while minor misreporting can occur, it’s extremely risky and tightly constrained by the need for legal, insurable, and financeable transactions.
Finally, suggesting that consumers bypass brands and buy directly from Chinese sites ignores legitimate concerns around quality control, warranty, customer service, and legal protections. Branded retail involves far more than just a label—it reflects an entire supply chain, quality assurance system, and customer support infrastructure.
Moreover, President Trump has already moved to close this loophole by tightening de minimis import rules—specifically targeting low-value shipments from Chinese e-commerce platforms. These new restrictions limit the ability of companies like Temu and Shein to flood the U.S. market with untaxed goods, ensuring that direct-from-China purchases no longer enjoy unfair cost advantages.
In short, Trump’s tariff strategy is having—and will continue to have—its intended effect: raising the price of Chinese goods, decreasing Chinese exports, increasing government revenue, and pushing consumers to demand lower-priced alternatives manufactured in the United States.
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